{"id":3376,"date":"2013-07-24T06:29:46","date_gmt":"2013-07-24T06:29:46","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/localhost\/cidac_eng\/index.php\/2013\/07\/24\/analysis-agenda-22-july-2013\/"},"modified":"2015-10-25T08:48:53","modified_gmt":"2015-10-25T08:48:53","slug":"analysis-agenda-22-july-2013","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cidacmx.org\/eng\/analysis-agenda-22-july-2013\/","title":{"rendered":"Analysis Agenda. 22 July, 2013."},"content":{"rendered":"<p>For the first time in over two decades, expectations regarding structural reforms in Mexico seem to drift away from being promises and start flirting with an eagerly awaited materialization. Even though the first post-revolutionary power alternation in 2000 generated similar hopes, it was almost immediately followed by disappointment mainly due to two essential factors: one, the reluctance of PRI \u2013 then in opposition \u2013 on allowing the PAN administration to carry out its political agenda; and two, the disappointing paralysis of a party that sold the image of a statesman on campaign and only ended up selling illusions. That way, between the negligence of some and the inability of others, the country has lost a valuable time in a rapidly changing world. Nowadays, the PRI restoration is a reality. However, so is the party plurality, whose main function will be to provide counterweight and enrich government work, something that PRI members couldn\u2019t manage to do once they were out of office.<\/p>\n<p>1-PAN\u2019s energy proposal: the longest possible stretch. On July 18th, the PAN national leadership released its project of energy reform. It is not sure that all groups within the party will back it up, particularly the Senate \u201cdissidents\u201d. On the other hand, the content of the initiative, whose precepts barely avoid the privatization of the country\u2019s essential resources; it also presents controversial suggestions that range from the transformation of PEMEX to a company that fits more into the oil process\u2019 competition scheme, the concessions to public, private and public\/private entities to a formula of managing the company\u2019s working liabilities (a potential blow to its union) and the empowerment of the Energy Secretariat as well as the National Hydrocarbon Commission. What is the feasibility \u2013 both politically and operatively \u2013 of this proposal? Where does it stand within the context of the future Presidential energy proposal?<\/p>\n<p>2-The opposition\u2019s political reform project in the Senate: raising the costs of voting. On July 17th, the most important PAN and PRD Senators presented 31 proposals that would modify not only the current electoral regime but the basis of all the political system. It is said that the aforementioned reforms would be backed by at least 46 of the 128 Senators \u2013 which, apparently, wouldn\u2019t be too useful, especially regarding any modification to the Constitution. Ernesto Cordero, as Senate President (a position to be held until August 31st), has stated his intention to discuss the political reform in the extraordinary period of the aforementioned Chamber on next August. When considering that all Constitutional reform carried out by the federal government wouldn\u2019t pass the Senate filter without the support of those who back the opposing political reform, how could the latter work as a negotiation mechanism between Executive and Legislative powers in the face of energy and tax reforms?<\/p>\n<p>3-The new Progressive Movement (Marcelo Ebrard version). On July 20th, the former Mayor of Mexico City has once again got into the limelight with the announcement of the formation of his own (official) political group within PRD. Even when the current Mexico City Mayor, Miguel \u00c1ngel Mancera (who by the way is not affiliated to the party), was absent from the official act, it certainly caught the attention that both PRD national leader, Jes\u00fas Zambrano, as well as members of the powerful Ren\u00e9 Bejarano faction, such as Dolores Padierna were present. Ebrard was notorious for challenging President Pe\u00f1a with a debate on energy reform, a wave which the former seems keen on surfing in order to obtain national exposure (his weak spot). In its future intention to be PRD leader, how will Ebrard manage to revive a party with decreasing government posts and, most importantly, with the threat of losing members with the future emergence of MORENA (Andr\u00e9s Manuel L\u00f3pez Obrador\u2019s party)?<\/p>\n<p>4-The informal sector: the country\u2019s third biggest pending task. Even though media attention is focused on energy and tax reforms as Mexico\u2019s potential growth engines, a fact that the aforementioned law modifications will not be able to solve: informality. During the official presentation act of the 2013 Program for the Formalization of Employment, President Pe\u00f1a acknowledged that 6 out of 10 employed workers are outside the ranks of the formal sector, one that does not include social security (medical service, retirement savings and house financing). Even though the recently approved labor reform would force the flexible procurement schemes (both per hour and professional fees) to provide regular benefits to its workers, it hasn\u2019t been completely clarified. Will this new National Crusade against Informal Employment materialize beyond simulation?<\/p>\n<p>5-Enrique Pe\u00f1a\u2019s (tacit) security strategy. The apprehension of the leader of the crime group Los Zetas, the so-called Z-40 (AKA Miguel \u00c1ngel Trevi\u00f1o) has been considered as the main achievement of the current administration regarding drug trafficking. It has also been mentioned a lot the change regarding the presentation of the act upon public opinion (in principle, without media montages). Nevertheless, this behavior is merely a symptom of a true modification in which the war against crime is being handled. Besides not being the government\u2019s trademark anymore, PGR (Mexican Attorney\u2019s Office) has assumed a more cautious role with its operations, which have been successfully centralizing around the Secretariat of Interior and, in relation with the latter, the cooperation with the U.S. tries not to be as intense as it is effective. What are the main implications of this new style on security issues?<\/p>\n<p>Antonio De la Cuesta<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>For the first time in over two decades, expectations regarding<br \/>\nstructural reforms in Mexico seem to drift away from being promises and<br \/>\nstart flirting with an eagerly awaited materialization. Even though the<br \/>\nfirst post-revolutionary power alternation in 2000 generated similar<br \/>\nhopes, it was almost immediately followed by disappointment mainly due<br \/>\nto two essential factors: one, the reluctance of PRI \u2013 then in<br \/>\nopposition \u2013 on allowing the PAN administration to carry out its<br \/>\npolitical agenda; and two, the disappointing paralysis of a party that<br \/>\nsold the image of a statesman on campaign and only ended up selling<br \/>\nillusions. That way, between the negligence of some and the inability of<br \/>\n others, the country has lost a valuable time in a rapidly changing<br \/>\nworld. Nowadays, the PRI restoration is a reality. However, so is the<br \/>\nparty plurality, whose main function will be to provide counterweight<br \/>\nand enrich government work, something that PRI members couldn\u2019t manage<br \/>\nto do once they were out of office.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":4661,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[14],"tags":[28],"class_list":["post-3376","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-weekly-political-analysis","tag-week-ahead"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cidacmx.org\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3376","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cidacmx.org\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cidacmx.org\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cidacmx.org\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cidacmx.org\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3376"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/cidacmx.org\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3376\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":4349,"href":"https:\/\/cidacmx.org\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3376\/revisions\/4349"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cidacmx.org\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4661"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cidacmx.org\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3376"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cidacmx.org\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3376"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cidacmx.org\/eng\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3376"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}